Telling geopolitical tales: temporality, rationality, and the 'childish' in the ongoing war for the Falklands-Malvinas Islands by Basham, Victoria M.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/90327/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Basham, Victoria 2015. Telling geopolitical tales: temporality, rationality, and the 'childish' in the
ongoing war for the Falklands-Malvinas Islands. Critical Studies on Security 3 (1) , pp. 77-89.
10.1080/21624887.2015.1014698 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1014698
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1014698>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telling Geopolitical Tales: Temporality, Rationality, and the Childish in the 
Ongoing War for the Falklands-Malvinas Islands 
 
Victoria M. Basham, University of Exeter1 
 
 
Department of Politics 
Amory Building  
Rennes Drive 
Exeter  
EX4 4RJ 
01392 725625 
v.m.basham@exeter.ac.uk  
  
Biographical Note 
Victoria M. Basham is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Exeter, UK. Her 
research focuses on issues of gender, race, class and sexuality in relation to 
militaries, militarism and militarization. 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Anniversaries of war often present opportunities for the telling and retelling of tales 
about the geopolitical; tales of a nation’s sovereignty, its identity, its security, and 
how these are imagined and reimagined through the notion of specific conflicts, their 
histories, beginnings, ends and aftermaths. By examining the case of the ongoing 
‘war’ over the Falklands-Malvinas, and a particular set of stories where the ‘childish’ 
has come to characterise relations and differences between Britain and Argentina, 
this paper explores how the temporality of ‘the anniversary’ can enable certain 
claims, about the rationality of war, as a means of safeguarding sovereignty, identity 
and security, to become common sensical. The paper argues that more attention 
should be paid to geopolitical tales of supposedly ‘adult’ and ‘childish’ characters 
because these constructions have the potential to normalise violence as a common-
sensical act of strong, adult nations; as an integral part of their national stories that 
obscures the aggressive role of the state in normalising and perpetuating violence.  
 
Keywords: Falklands-Malvinas; childishness; temporality; identity, sovereignty; 
security 
 
Introduction: Telling Geopolitical Tales  
Anniversaries, particularly those marking the outbreak or cessation of wars, present 
significant opportunities for the telling of geopolitical tales and the reproduction of 
geopolitical ‘truths’. As markers of an ‘event’ in which questions and performances of 
sovereignty, territory, security and national identity invariably coalesce, anniversaries 
of war are never just recurrent dates in the calendar where ‘the past’ is consciously 
brought into the present; they are always productive of political and social relations. 
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As a calendric feature, all anniversaries “arise from, and are perpetuated by, social 
requirements”; their meaning and marking relies on common, social and mutually 
held understandings of time and its significance to the collective (Sorokin & Merton 
1937: 626). As examples of what Sorokin and Merton (1937) call ‘social time’, war 
anniversaries can provide “opportunities for remembrance and recreation that cut 
across and reinvent time” (Hutchings 2007: 72), whilst simultaneously producing 
temporal boundaries and distinctions about the nature of the past, present and future 
(Lundborg 2012). Anniversaries of war often nurture attempts to ‘fix’ the meaning of 
the practices of violence conjured into memory, practices that, though neither 
temporally nor spatially stable, often constitute the shifting foundations on which 
claims about national boundaries, roles and identities are frequently built (Edkins 
2003; Till 2003). Anniversaries of war may also foster stories that justify and 
legitimate the death and violence the events they mark entailed (Dodds 1993) and 
more often than not, they are characterised by political discourses that seek to affirm 
an imagined past or pasts regarded as “useful for justifying present interests” 
(Staudinger in Wodak et al 2009:70).  
 
In light of the productive and social characteristics of anniversaries, and given that 
people frequently attach a distinctive significance to any calendric date “that is in any 
way outstanding” (Forrest 1993:445), it is perhaps unsurprising that recent 
anniversaries of the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War have marked renewed and 
reinvigorated rounds of (ongoing) tale-telling by British, Argentinian and Islander 
representatives, officials, politicians, media and publics alike. The discursive 
reproduction of the War and the contested sovereignty of the Falklands-Malvinas 
Islands began long ago, is likely to ensue for much time to come, and takes many 
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forms, from the cultural and social to the legal and economic. However, there is one 
particular configuration of political discourses that has re-surfaced in recent years 
that can reveal much about how ideas of national identity, sovereignty and security 
coalesce to animate certain forms of geopolitical practice over others. The discursive 
tropes that concern me herein are those that draw on the notion of the ‘childish’. 
From claims that Argentina acts like a playground bully to the notion that the UK 
cannot accept basic facts that would be apparent to small children, ideas and beliefs 
about what comes to be understood as ‘childish’ permeate the politics of the 
Falkland-Malvinas.  
 
What we come to recognise as childhood (the spatial and temporal limits of what 
precedes adulthood) and the child or children (the personhood prior to adulthood) is 
configured and reconfigured within different social spaces and temporalities; 
childhood and ‘the child’ is the outcome of social transformations and continuities not 
a natural state of being (Ariès 1962; Holmer Nadesan 2010). Indeed, our 
understandings of childhood are often not much at all about the lived experiences of 
the young, but about our collective beliefs about what children are, can be and 
should be. Equally, what therefore enables us to determine if something or someone 
is identifiable as ‘childish’ in nature or behaviour - who and what comes to be 
understood as resembling or reminiscent of a ‘child’ - is also historically, socially and 
culturally contingent.  
 
One of the most significant functions of the notion of the modern child is its capacity 
to produce and reproduce modern ‘man’ as the agent of action, rationality, maturity 
and order (Jenks 2005). What has come to characterise the rational adult, able of 
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expressing their reasoned will, is their transcendence of the partiality that plagues 
childhood as a space of the “pre-social, potentially social, [and] in the process of 
becoming social” (Alanen 1988: 56). Since the nineteenth century this notion of the 
unfinished adult has grown especially with the proliferation of psychiatry. Childhood 
became a potential origin for abnormality in later life in this period, and adults 
became at risk from the condition of ‘arrested development’, a term denoting an 
adult, who had seemingly transcended childhood, acting out ‘like a child’ rather than 
an adult according to prevalent social norms of what constituted these subjectivities 
(Foucault 2003). 
 
As such, the child has come to be “defined only by what the child is not but is 
subsequently going to be, and not by what the child presently is” (Alanen 1988: 56). 
It is in this context of becoming, of being incomplete, that the child becomes at once 
familiar yet strange to those who have come to be socially recognisable as ‘adult’. 
After all, adults were once children; indeed, the very condition of being reassured 
that one is an adult is that one is no longer a child. As social beings who are 
simultaneously ‘like us’ but ‘not like us’, children are not merely what adults are not 
however, but are more like what Simmel (1971) and Bauman (1991) call ‘strangers’. 
Strangers “are not perceived as individuals, but as strangers of a certain type” 
(Simmel 1971:148) and they require processes of assimilation not only to overcome 
their strangeness but to be considered as individuals capable of expressing reason. 
Whereas adults are drivers of agency, children are vehicles for structure.   
 
The heroes of many a geopolitical tale are rational and ordered actors not children or 
sufferers of arrested development. They are individual agents in control of their 
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destinies and the destinies of others, but who have often had to confront muddled 
and irrational others in order to save the nation or the world from invasion, economic 
collapse, nuclear destruction, and so on. As various feminists have argued though 
(inter alia Tickner 1992; Petersen 1998; Steans 1998), claims to rationality ought to 
invite caution. They often entail “a reinforcement of the superiority of masculine 
characteristics such as rationality, resolve and strength” and frequently, with them, 
‘strong’ military responses (Basham & Vaughan-Williams 2013: 516). Accusations of 
‘childish’ behaviour can thus denigrate some practices whilst normalising others. As 
attempts to define the scope for political agency, they can play a significant role in 
determining what courses of action are most intelligible and come to be considered 
‘sensible’.  
 
In what follows, I focus primarily on British claims about the supposed childishness of 
Argentina in the ongoing ‘war’ over the Falklands-Malvinas. I examine two mutually 
reinforcing ways in which Argentina is defined as behaving in ways supposedly more 
befitting children than adults - that Argentina is a ‘sore loser’, unable to accept defeat 
and Britain’s legitimate claim to the Falklands, and that Argentina is a ‘bully’, acting 
out because it cannot get its way. I focus on these two particular tales in order to 
suggest that characterising Argentina as a somewhat puerile and fledgling nation 
allows Britain to define and consolidate itself on the world-stage as a rational adult 
nation worthy of being listened to. I attempt to demonstrate that this particular 
formation of identity, sovereignty and security enables military violence to become an 
integral part of the British national story, obscuring the aggressive role of the state in 
perpetuating violence over other practices. I conclude however, by considering how 
different tales are possible; tales that might disrupt the notion of the ‘rational’ adult by 
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questioning how the lived realities of children may serve as an important reminder of 
the irrationality of war.    
 
Sore losers: 1833 and all that 
War is the raison d’être of the modern state. The sovereignty of states is “produced 
and defined by organised violence”; states proffer citizens security in exchange for 
their compliance, and it is war therefore, that produces and defines political 
community (Edkins 2003: 6). As a ubiquitous aspect of the national story, war 
engenders tales about its history, about specific wars themselves, and about the 
aftermath of war. The 74 days of military violence in 1982 that has come to be known 
in Britain as The Falklands War and in Argentina as La Guerra de las Malvinas, has 
been the subject of many stories. One especially salient telling for Argentina is of a 
breach of national sovereignty. The history of the War is of Las Islas Malvinas being 
forcibly seized in 1833 by a colonial power and of Argentina trying to regain its stolen 
territory ever since. The War in this story is a tale of reasserting a sovereign right to 
the Islands by sending troops there in 1982 to secure them, at the cost of an 
estimated 650 Argentine lives. Since the end of the War, a villainous Britain has 
consistently refused to engage in a legitimate dialogue with Argentina over the 
sovereignty of the Islands, which it continues to illegally colonise and militarise.  
 
For Britain, an alternative but equally salient telling of the Falklands War is that the 
Islands have been British sovereign territory since 1833. The War of 1982 came 
about because the security of the Britons who legitimately resided there came under 
threat from Argentine aggression. This necessitated sending troops to the Islands at 
the cost 255 British servicemen and merchant seamen’s lives, and the lives of 3 
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women Islanders2. In Britain’s tale, the aftermath of the War has been characterised 
firstly by the suspension of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina until 
1990, and since then, by relations with Argentina that have shifted from dialogical to 
hostile due to Argentina’s refusal to accept the reality that the Falklands are British.   
 
Whilst wars are the very condition of the state, they also have the capacity to 
unsettle the routinised temporality of social and political life (Edkins 2003). As 
something ‘unexpected’, war can constitute an affront to an everyday life imagined, 
performed and experienced as continuity. For traumas like wars to be socially 
intelligible therefore, re-imaginings are often necessary; and these frequently invoke 
“a linear narrative of national heroism” (Edkins 2003: xv). This is especially apparent 
in Britain’s tale of the War. As Femenia (2000: 42) argues, when Argentine troops 
surrendered on 14 June 1982:  
 
“both countries were left with the symbolic treasure over which they fought; 
Britain was left with a renewed sense of British world greatness and Argentina 
appropriated the role of victimized, heroic David resisting the prepotency of the 
superpowers”  
 
Trauma’s destabilising capacity has necessitated the rehabilitation of the War as an 
integral part of both nations’ national stories and one particularly important effect of 
the reassertion of linearity is that the War appears to have “tragically confirmed for each 
national player… that war is a legitimate means to get to know who they are, and what 
they stand for” (Femenia 2000:42). In one tale of the Falklands-Malvinas, a victim 
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requires a stubborn aggressor. In another, a victor requires a loser. In both, however, 
the War is central to the intelligibility of those roles.   
 
Recent anniversaries of the Falklands-Malvinas War suggest these stories of the 
War remain significant to the production of both nations as sovereign. On the thirtieth 
anniversary of the start of military hostilities, an anniversary with a number imbued 
with an almost ‘magic’ quality, Argentine President Cristina Fernández De Kirchner 
(in BBC News Online 2012) marked the occasion with a speech in which she 
reasserted Argentina’s claim to the Islands but also its peaceful stance. She told the 
assembled crowd that with every day that goes by, British control of the Islands:  
 
“looks more ridiculous, more absurd to the eyes of the world…It is an injustice 
that in the 21st Century there are still colonial enclaves... 16 colonial enclaves 
throughout the world - 10 of those belonging to the United Kingdom…We also 
demand that so they stop usurping our environment, our natural resources, 
our oil…[but] wars only bring backwardness and hatred". 
 
Similarly, Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman (2013) has insisted that Las 
Islas Malvinas are a “colonized territory” and a “militarized enclave of an extra-
regional power”; that they rightfully belong to Argentina and that the ongoing dispute 
is a “matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity” for Argentina. British Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s speech on the thirtieth anniversary of the War conjures a different 
telling of sovereignty, however. He stated that:  
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“[t]hirty years ago today the people of the Falkland Islands suffered an act of 
aggression that sought to rob them of their freedom and their way of life. 
Today is a day for commemoration and reflection: a day to remember all 
those who lost their lives in the conflict - the members of our armed forces, as 
well as the Argentinian personnel who died” (Cameron in BBC News Online 
2012).  
 
Cameron (in BBC News Online 2012) went on to applaud the "heroism" of British 
troops and their role in “righting a profound wrong" and reminded his audience that:  
 
"Britain remains staunchly committed to upholding the right of the Falkland 
Islanders, and of the Falkland Islanders alone, to determine their own future. 
That was the fundamental principle that was at stake 30 years ago: and that is 
the principle which we solemnly reaffirm today." 
 
These competing tales of sovereignty are the context for the UK’s repeated refusal to 
engage in discussions of sovereignty over the Islands with Argentina, on the grounds 
that it will only do so if and when the Islanders welcome these talks. Though giving 
due consideration to the wishes of the Islanders is important, Britain’s refusal to 
engage with Argentina also reinforces the notion that Argentina is a sore loser. As 
David Cameron (2011) put it to the House of Commons in 2011, “as long as the 
Falkland Islands want to be sovereign British territory, they should remain sovereign 
British territory—full stop, end of story”. Argentina appears as like a haranguing child, 
who despite being told to play fair, insists on getting its way, who needs to be told by 
the rational adult that enough is enough. Though adults are accused of being sore 
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losers, a sense of arrested development – the inability to fully transcend childhood - 
is often blamed for such behaviour. As Goodheart (2011: 527) argues:  
 
“We have been taught from childhood not to be sore losers in the realization 
that it is only a game. A grandparent playing with his grandson learns how 
much easier it is to teach him the rules than to accept defeat...The rabid fans 
who rail against the losers on sports radio and threaten mayhem if the losing 
doesn’t stop are the childish adults who never learned to distinguish between 
real life and a game”.  
 
As the victor of the 1982 War, ‘Britain’ was performed, at that juncture, through 
“celebratory set pieces” in the tabloid press, replete with the usual invocations of 
‘patriotism’ - such as in the News of the World’s “Our boys caught Argies Napping” 
headline - and ‘jokes’ - such as in the Sun’s notorious “Stick it up your Junta” 
headline (Latin America Bureau 1982: 119-120). Britain continues to be performed 
as the nation that accepted the reality of its role as victor and as the nation still able 
to hold victory parades and still able to speak of the heroism of its soldiers, it has 
emerged from the War as the storyteller with the capacity to point out it won and to 
point out the loser, and a sore one at that. Argentina is easily portrayed as unable to 
grasp that the ‘game’ is up, that the reality of defeat must be accepted if it wants to 
be taken seriously on the world stage.  
 
Standing up to the Childish Bully (of Buenos Aires) 
For many British commentators, it is Argentina’s aggressive ‘bullying’ stance that 
most characterises recent tales of the Falklands-Malvinas. The idea of Argentina as 
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a land of bullies frequently appears in online article reader comments and in the 
observations of political commentators. Falklands legislator Roger Edwards (in 
United Nations Department of Public Information 2012), who has accused Argentina 
of seeking to take away the rights of the Islanders, has asserted that, "all that we ask 
for is the right to determine our own future without the bullying tactics of a 
neighbouring country". British Foreign Secretary William Hague (in Wooding 2013) 
also recently stated that although there “was a time in the 1990s when there was a 
dialogue…the current Government of Argentina has turned away from that dialogue 
into a pattern of bullying and intimidatory behaviour towards the Falkland Islands”; he 
also asserted that he wanted Argentina “to know that this approach is completely 
counter-productive” (Hague in Wooding 2013).  
 
Adults can be bullies of course and in some settings, behaviour that might constitute 
bullying is actually esteemed as a ‘robust management style’ and so forth. However, 
the bullying behaviour of adults is often viewed as a power relation, as a way of 
gaining certain aims and objectives. In contrast to the agentic and proactive 
individual adult however, the child bully, as a social being in the process of becoming 
and not yet an agentic social actor, is merely reacting to circumstances beyond its 
full comprehension. Thus Hague’s insistence that bullying is “counter-productive” is 
more evocative of a teacher, or a parent, or any adult figure, telling a child that 
bullies never win, that one should not give in to intimidation rather than of a 
purposeful geopolitical strategy.  The bully label thus casts Argentina as childish, as 
arrested in its development, and Britain as sensible and adult. In doing so, this 
supports the legitimacy of Britain’s geopolitical claims about itself. To be rational is to 
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be decisive, to be worthy of speaking and being listened to; to be a childish bully is 
quite the opposite.  
 
Such discourses also work to conceal Britian’s own bullying or rather to rehabilitate it 
as an adult practice; as the right to militarily defend itself from a more destructive and 
hostile party, much like the robust manager. The idea that Britain is a nation that 
bravely stands up to intimidation is symptomatic of a longstanding facet of British 
national identity that transcends the Falklands-Malvinas. Shortly after the 1982 War, 
Anthony Barnett (2012) argued that one of its most significant effects was to allow 
Thatcher and Thatcher’s Britain to cling to ‘Churchillism’; to simultaneously express 
‘ourselves’ as the plucky underdog, a small island nation threatened once again by 
Nazism - this time in the form of Argentine fascism - whilst still being a significant 
world player that, given Britain’s modesty (even in light of its military might), meant 
the world simply needed British leadership. In an updated edition, Barnett (2012) 
claims that this ‘Falklands Syndrome’, a development of Churchillism, has continued 
to foster a feeling of entitlement to demonstrate British military superiority whenever 
possible, and that any defeat or setback simply justifies this further. For Barnett, this 
political discourse of national identity facilitated recent ill-fated military ‘adventures’ in 
Iraq and Afghanistan among others. Though the syndrome that Barnett identifies 
may have a longer heritage than the Falklands, 1982 and its anniversaries have 
represented particularly important opportunities for the re-articulation of Britain as 
‘Churchillian’. Contemporary British posturing over the Falklands-Malvinas may be in 
part about an Island in the South Atlantic and the people who live there, but it also 
facilitates the notion that Britain is a defiant, tolerant and plucky nation that deserves 
to have a role of influence on the world (Barnett 2012). Argentina, in contrast is a 
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young, inexperienced nation that needs to ‘grow up’. That Britain, an old power, 
continues to be discursively reproduced as a voice of reason in the face of the 
childish bullying of a fledgling former colony, can only serve to reinforce this self-
belief and projection.   
 
Images of a bullying Argentina and a Britain respectful of the wishes of the Islanders 
were also prevalent following the outcome of a referendum in March 2013 in which 
just three Falkland Islanders voted against the Falkland Islands retaining their 
current political status as an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. The 
remaining 99.7% of voters voted in favour, and as there was a voter turnout of over 
90% it was popularly concluded that the outcome was undeniably pro-British. British 
Prime Minister David Cameron (in BBC News Online 2013) responded in a speech 
to the press the next day that the “Falkland Islands may be thousands of miles away 
but they are British through and through and that is how they want to stay…People 
should know we will always be there to defend them”.  
 
President Cristina Fernández De Kirchner disagreed though. Also invoking the idea 
of the ‘childish’, she questioned the very notion of an "English territory more than 
12,000km away” and claimed that the question was “not even worthy of a 
kindergarten of three year olds”3 (Fernández De Kirchner in Alexander 2013). Here 
the suggestion is that even children, beings of ongoing developmental cognition, 
would be able to comprehend the absurdity of Britain’s claims to the Islands. The 
common response among British media sources however, was to deride De 
Kirchner’s statement as a ‘Twitter rant’. Once again her claims were marked out and 
denigrated as irrational, bullying and childish.  
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It is not only Argentina but specifically Argentina’s leader who is frequently accused 
of being a bully. Former aide to Margaret Thatcher, Nile Gardiner, has taken to 
calling Argentine President Cristina Fernández De Kirchner ‘the bully of Buenos 
Aires’ (Gardiner 2013) and the much-respected British Falklands War veteran, 
Simon Weston (in Beech 2013) has called her “a sad lonely woman who's desperate 
to live out her dead husband's wishes”. As a ‘bully’ and a woman “desperate” to fulfil 
her husband’s legacy to regain Islas Las Malvinas for Argentina, Kirchner is at once 
gender nonconforming as a bully and gender conforming as the ‘good wife’. In both 
cases, the representations of her, and of Argentina as an intimidating bully, are 
indicative of what Hutchings (2008: 33) calls a cognitive shortcut, something that 
resonates and resounds because it is part of the gendered and “entrenched logic[s]” 
that pervade the wider political imaginary. The notion that Argentina and Kirchner are 
bullies is a cognitive shortcut to irrationality and childishness on their part. As well as 
working to undermine Argentina’s claims, however ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ they 
may be, and its right even to speak and be heard, Britain emerges as that which 
Argentina is not, as the rational, adult speaker able to put forward claims built on 
reason. In standing up to the bully of Buenos Aires, Britain can only ever be the hero 
of this particular geopolitical tale.  
    
This is also evident in other tales about the Islanders’ right to self-determination, the 
right to remain ‘British’ should they chose to do so. Amid calls from the Argentine 
government in January 2012 for the UK to attend UN-led discussions over the future 
of the governing of the Islands, David Cameron (2012) told the British House of 
Commons that:  
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“The absolutely vital point is that we are clear that the future of the Falkland 
Islands is a matter for the people themselves. As long as they want to remain 
part of the United Kingdom and be British, they should be able to do so. That 
is absolutely key. I am determined to make sure that our defences and 
everything else are in order, which is why the National Security Council 
discussed the issue yesterday…I would argue that what the Argentinians 
have said recently is far more like colonialism, as these people want to remain 
British and the Argentinians want them to do something else”. 
 
Though again asserting that military force is an option for the UK in supporting self-
determination for the Islanders, Cameron’s mention of Argentina’s ‘colonialism’, and 
its assault on that self-determination, is suggestive of the very need to deal with a 
bullying Argentine aggressor, and militarily if necessary4. However, this discourse 
diverts attention from Britain’s colonial past; away from how Britain’s capacity to self-
define as a plucky island nation, wishing to defend another of its own plucky islands, 
relies on the erasure of the violence of British Empire and its exploitation of the lands 
and bodies of others as an integral part of the nation, if not the national story. It also 
disguises the ways in which Britain’s belief in self-determination has always been 
contingent. For example, between 1968 and 1973, the British Government exiled all 
1,500-2,000 inhabitants of Diego Garcia, a British overseas territory, to make way for 
a US military base (Vine 2009); and the 1982 war coincided with the ongoing 
deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland where self-determination was a right 
that was not extended to the people of that particular island when it was forcibly 
partitioned by Britain in the 1920s (Conroy 1987).   
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The notion of Argentine colonialism also obscures Britain’s colonial practices in Latin 
America, including its initial desire to occupy, populate and secure the Falklands-
Malvinas to access Latin American markets and thwart a Spanish colonial monopoly. 
It overlooks its paternalistic economic relationship with Argentina in the period after 
its decolonisation and well beyond (Latin America Bureau 1982) and how very little 
attention was paid by Britain, despite its self-identity as a key world player, to the 
inability of Argentines to determine their futures in 1982. Argentines were ineligible to 
vote and were governed by a military junta infamous for kidnapping, torturing and 
murdering its own citizens. Moreover, although Britain was well-aware of the human 
rights abuses in Argentina in 1970s and early 1980s, less than a year before Britain 
despatched its troops to the Falklands-Malvinas, the then Minister of Trade, Cecil 
Parkinson led a trade delegation to Argentina. Prior to doing so, he insisted that 
“trade with other countries should be determined by commercial considerations and 
not by the character of the governments concerned” (Parkinson in Latin America 
Bureau 1982: 84). Furthermore, British claims to respect the self-determination of the 
Islanders ought to invite critique. Though the military hostilities of 1982 were also 
characterised as a ‘War of self-determination’, where British troops fought for the 
rights of fellow British citizens to decide who would govern them, the Islands were 
governed at that time by a non-elected Governor appointed by London (Latin 
America Bureau 1982). In the process of wilfully forgetting its suppression or 
disregard for self-determination in some sites but not others, Britain has been able to 
contract and expand its borders at will; to re-assert its national identity, sovereign 
rights and its right to secure both in particular ways. 
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Another tale that Britain tells about the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Islands and its 
subsequent decision to send troops to the South Atlantic is that the invasion was an 
act of aggression that had to be tackled so it did not set the troubling international 
precedent of a breach of sovereignty going unpunished. In a post Afghanistan 2001 
and Iraq 2003 world, the logics of this position are hardly difficult to critique but 
neither was this a compelling yarn in 1982. From support for Chile’s campaigns of 
violence within its borders and without in Central America, to its refusal to provide 
sanctuary to Latin American political refugees without the blessing of the CIA, 
“Britain’s less than illustrious record of standing up to international 
aggression…make its pretensions to an international policing role highly 
discreditable (Latin America Bureau 1982: 104).     
 
The notion that Britain ‘stands up’ to intimidation is however, a productive one; it not 
only reinforces British claims about sovereignty but also about its right to militarily 
defend it and about its identity as a rational actor on the world stage. As a nation that 
can so readily demonstrate the rationality, resolve and strength that have come to be 
widely associated with war and war preparedness, it is difficult to mark Britain as 
irrational and childish. Conversely, it is easy to characterise Argentina in this way in 
a geopolitical context where the idea that war is inevitable is considered common 
sense, despite being based on a notion of ‘human’ nature founded in the 
experiences of a small number of (white) men (inter alia Tickner 1992; Steans 1998).  
 
War is not healthy for children and other living things5 
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“[The] Tin-Pot Foreign General wanted to be important. He wanted to do 
something Historical so that his name would be printed in all the big History 
Books. So, one day, he got all his soldiers and all his guns and he put them 
into boats. Then he sailed them over the sea to the sad little island. There he 
stamped ashore and bagsied the sad little island for his own…Far away over 
the sea there lived an old woman with lots of money and guns…When this 
Old Iron Woman heard that the Tin-Pot Foreign General had bagsied the sad 
little island, she flew into a rage. It’s MINE! She screeched. “MINE! MINE! 
MINE! I bagsied it ages ago! I bagsied it FIRST! DID! DID! DID!” (Briggs 1984: 
8-15). 
 
As effective of social and political relations of power, discourses of the childish can 
also enable other tales, however. Renowned British children’s author Raymond 
Briggs’ particular tale of the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War is of a childish squabble 
between the egotistical ‘Tin-Pot’ Argentine General Leopoldo Galtieri and Britain’s 
richer but equally stubborn ‘Old Iron Woman’, the then Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. Though who ‘bagsied’ the Islands and when continues to ensure that tales 
of the past are dredged up to justify and articulate the present stand-off, and to 
envisage oppositional, divergent futures, Briggs’ tale pokes fun at the futility of such 
squabbling by casting both Britain and Argentina as resembling the behaviour of 
children. Though his depiction of Thatcher relies on sexualised caricature – for 
example, images of coins flowing out from Thatcher’s iron breasts to pay for her war 
– and elides other ways to be a child, Briggs’ tale could be regarded as what 
Agamben (2007; see also Basham & Vaughan-Williams 2013) calls a ‘profanation’. 
In toying with the ‘serious’ activity of war and its associated claims about legality, 
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territory and political economy, by belittling it as a childish squabble, Briggs’ story 
returns the war to the everyday; to performances and practices that take place in 
mundane spaces. Whilst Briggs’ book also highlights that the implications of such 
childish squabbles are far from innocent, comical or silly – several pages of the book 
detail the deaths of the men shot, torn apart and burned alive – it also unsettles more 
realist notions of war as an expression of rational, objective power, as self-evidently 
in the ‘national interest’ and as distinct from the social, the everyday (Tickner 1992).   
 
Another way that childish can come to unsettle more prominent - or more loudly 
shouted - geopolitical tales is by looking to actual lived experiences of childhood. 
The agency and everyday lives of children are frequently erased from geopolitical 
tales but also, as I have tried to show, in the very expression of what we come to 
recognise as childhood and the childish. Though the multiple ways in which 
Argentine, British and Island children experienced the War, and how children 
continue to understand it, are beyond the scope of this particular article and warrant 
further research, there are still some stories that highlight the value of paying more 
attention to childhood and how it is militarised that can be considered here.  
 
One such story is about some of the young men who fought. Despite the increased 
participation of women in the British armed forces, particularly over the past two 
decades or so, British service personnel have long been and are still frequently 
referred to as ‘our boys’ and the Falklands-Malvinas War was no exception. This 
collective moniker had and continues to have a number of political implications. As 
Helen Parr (2013) has argued, such mentions of ‘our boys’ during the Falklands-
Malvinas War by politicians including the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and 
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by the British press, not only highlighted the fact that the Task Force was comprised 
exclusively of men – women were deployed but only in auxiliary roles, not combat - 
but also that these troops were not quite fully grown men. In being identified in this 
‘in-between’ way but also as ‘ours’, British soldiers became sons of the nation. Their 
role as protectors of that nation may have motivated their deployment but as always 
someone’s ‘boy’, they were also in need of the protection provided by that nation. 
Indeed, after the British sank the General Belgrano, bringing about the deaths of 323 
Argentine sailors, Thatcher told the House of Commons that “our first duty is to 
protect our boys” (cited in Parr 2013: 2). Violence, in the form of killing or be killed, 
perhaps becomes a little more palatable when the life of one’s sons is at stake.  
 
Another function of the invocation of ‘our boys’ to describe a body of men of very 
different ages is to conceal the fact that under-18s, boys in the literal sense of the 
word, were put in actual danger. Much has been made of the notion that the 
Argentine invading forces were comprised not only of ill-equipped and poorly trained 
conscripts but young ones at that (see Stewart 1991) and it is the case that many 
were eighteen, nineteen and twenty year-olds with limited training and combat 
experience. Though some stories tell of an Argentina united behind a popular 
invasion in 1982, one source of dissent came from members of the Madres de Plaza 
de Mayo, the group of mothers and other relatives who took to the streets to protect 
the ‘disappearances’ of children during the years of Argentina’s military rule from 
1976-1983. As one mother said:  
 
“We were opposed to the Malvinas [War] because for us they were doing the 
same thing as they did to our children. They kidnapped those young soldiers 
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as well, because they were sent there by force…We were against it because 
the military were using it to raise their prestige, to try to glorify 
themselves…They wanted to keep their hands soaked in the blood of our 
young people” (Carmen de Guede in Fisher 1989: 115).  
  
Less has been made of the British deployment of seventeen year-olds into combat 
however, and that the youngest British soldier killed in Falklands-Malvinas War, 
Paratrooper Ian Scrivens, was just seventeen when he died. He was killed in the 
same violent incident as fellow Paratroopers Jason Burt, who was also seventeen 
years old, and Neil Grose, who turned 18 on the day that all three boys were killed. 
Britain remains the only state of the EU, Council of Europe and United Nations 
Security Council Permanent Members that still recruits from age 16, and although 
under-18s in the British armed forces are prohibited from participation in armed 
conflict by official government policy, this policy can be overruled if ‘military need’ 
deems the deployment of minors necessary, or where it is considered impracticable 
to withdraw them before deployment (Child Soldiers International & ForcesWatch 
2013).      
 
Conclusion 
Anniversaries marking ‘events’ associated with the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War in 
social time have facilitated the telling of a variety of geopolitical tales about 
sovereignty, national identity and security. Such stories have resurfaced ‘periodically’ 
with calendric markers and are likely to continue to resurface given that the war over 
the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Las Islas Malvinas, and its place in the 
national stories of Britain and Argentina, is far from settled. As I have attempted to 
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demonstrate, one particularly salient story is of a sensible Britain standing up to an 
Argentine sore loser and bully; of an adult, rational and ordered Britain that finds 
meaning in contradistinction to the muddled and frenzied activities of the childish 
Argentine other. Such metaphors and figures of speech invoking the ‘childish’ are as 
Shapiro (1985: 195) argues, never “mere adornments added to the cognitive 
meaning of expressions. They impose and order our reality insofar as they create 
meaning and value”6. Indeed, as I have tried to demonstrate, where childhood 
surfaces as metaphor in the ongoing war for the Falklands-Malvinas, it constitutes an 
attempt to determine the parameters for political action.  
 
The functioning of a geopolitical order of rational actors also relies on routinised and 
assumed notions of Newtonian temporality. As a trauma, something that has the 
capacity to disrupt the continuity of everyday life, war has to be remade, retold as an 
integral, normal part of the national story. As Lundborg (2012) argues, to speak of 
war as an ‘event’ relies greatly on such suppositions that war has a clear before and 
after, a singularity and coherence. These assumptions are not only reliant upon the 
materialisation of a speaker who decides the boundaries of the ‘event’ however, but 
also on the erasure of multiple experiences of war as lived, ongoing and resurgent, 
rather than contained. For the soldier with PTSD re-living each battle as a visceral 
experience for example, war is never a simple matter of before and after but is a 
constant, a continuum (Sylvester 2010).  
 
When considered this way, the analysis of any ‘war’ necessarily entails paying 
greater attention to everyday social practices and processes that foster war 
preparedness and the prioritisation of military force in societies as well as notions of 
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‘war’ itself (Cockburn 2012). Attempts to speak of the 74 days of military violence 
between Argentina and Britain in 1982 as an event can also be troubled by exploring 
traces of the geopolitical in the everyday. Even for Britain as the ‘victor’, something 
highly suggestive of a clear end-point to the war, the suicides and post-traumatic 
stress of veterans “tell a different tale” (Edkins 2003: 1). Moreover, though maps, 
textbooks, memorials, and so on enable the reproduction of the Falkland Islands/Las 
Islas Malvinas in everyday settings in Argentina, Britain and on the Islands 
themselves, the meaning and significance of these everyday artefacts cannot be 
assumed to be universally shared (Benwell & Dodds 2011). As others have also 
shown, expressions of ‘everyday nationalism’ suggestive of a degree of unity with 
national storytelling can also be temporally contingent (Benwell & Dodds 2011; see 
also Jones and Merriman 2009). They often rely on the ‘heating up’ of longstanding 
tensions to jog the memories of people consumed with more pressing daily matters 
(Benwell and Dodds 2011). Moreover, and importantly, though childhood and the 
childish as social discourses often elide the actual experiences of children and deny 
them a bona fide subjectivity, alternative tales depicting the childish behaviour of 
supposed adults in facilitating childhoods marred by violence tell a different story.   
 
War is not an inevitability therefore; neither is it a contained event. It is not in any 
way healthy for children and other living things. The reincorporation of war into a 
national story characterised by periods of war and peace conceals the role of that 
very state in the production of war and the ruptures it creates. However, by paying 
closer attention to the stories the state tells, and by looking to others, the state’s 
reliance on a geopolitical story of distinct periods of war and peace for claiming 
authority via its capacity to provide continued security for its citizens becomes more 
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visibly contingent (Edkins 2003). Claims about the childish may have the potential to 
facilitate militarism; the telling of geopolitical tales of rational heroism in the face of 
sore losers and bullies may materialise war and its violence but as geopolitical tales, 
other stories are always possible.  
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2
 These 3 civilian women were mistakenly killed by British troops and weapons.   
3
 This is a rough translation. The original tweet reads: “Territorio inglés a más de 12 mil kms de 
distancia? La pregunta no aguanta ni jardín de infantes de 3 años”.  
4
 In February 2012 the Royal Navy dispatched HMS Dauntless, a Type 45 destroyer and one of its 
most advanced warships to the South Atlantic and the Royal Air Force deployed Prince William, heir 
to the British throne, to the Islands to carry out search and rescue duties. This was widely reported as 
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having been interpreted by Kirchner’s administration as an act of aggression. Cameron is also 
reportedly willing to send fast jets and troops to the Islands (Mason 2013).  
5
 This anti-war slogan was especially popularised by Lorraine Schneider’s 1966 poster which 
displayed the slogan and a flower. It emerged in reaction to the Vietnam War.   
6
 See also Reeves, 2013 on the political significance of metaphor.  
